Attacks at Anchor

3. A ship at anchor is usually boarded from a small boat under the cover of darkness. Most attacks occur between 0100 and 0600 hrs. Often the raiders will try not to alert the crew though they may take a crew member hostage and threaten him either to gain information or to intimidate and gain control over the master or other crew members, or to gain access to the crews' quarters. Communication equipment may be destroyed to prevent or delay the alarm being raised; crews' quarters may be raided for portable personal possessions; the master's safe may be opened and any cash stolen and there may either alternatively or simultaneously be some opening of containers or holds. There is some evidence of selective opening of containers or holds with high value cargoes implying prior knowledge of the cargo manifest. The attackers may also steal any movable ship's stores. Having removed what they can carry, the raiders depart. There is some evidence that members of boarding parties have been recognised as previously having had access to the ship as employees of shore based cleaning or other contractors.

Attacks when Underway

4. Attacks on ships when underway are most common in South East Asian waters. A large proportion of attacks in this area have occurred in the Selat Phillip (Phillip Channel) and other Channels used by vessels making passage via the Malacca Straits. Other attacks have taken place in the South China Sea and in waters adjacent to the Philippines. Attacks can take place in either international waters as piracy or, more commonly, as armed robbery in territorial waters of a coastal state. Recent evidence indicates that it is not safe to assume that they are not carrying firearms.

5. Under cover of darkness, again most often between 0100 and 0600 hrs, high speed, low profile craft come alongside the intended target usually approaching from the stern but also the sides if the ship has a low freeboard. Access to the ship will often be by climbing up poles or grappling irons hooked on to the ship's rail. Attackers have shown considerable skill and daring and have boarded ships traveling in excess of 17 knots and with high freeboards. They have demonstrated knowledge of ship's procedures, often seeking to board when bridge and engine room personnel are fully engaged in navigating through congested or restricted waters, and knowledge of the general layout of the ships they have attacked. The small craft used by the attackers may come from adjacent coastlines or be launched from "mother" ships - larger vessels running without lights have occasionally been reported in the vicinity of ships which have been attacked.

6. Attackers have boarded ships, made their way to the master's cabin and intimidated him into opening the safe. They have then departed taking what they can with them without alerting any other members of the crew. There have also been incidents of crew members being seized and threatened to secure the crew's compliance. In a number of incidents the entire crew has been seized and locked up. For the period of the raid and until the crew were able to release themselves the ship has continued on its way without supervision leading to a significant risk of collision or grounding with accompanying loss of life or, if an oil tanker or chemical carrier, major pollution.

7. The main targets of the South East Asian attacker appear to be cash in the ship's safe, crew possessions and any portable ship's equipment, even including coils of rope. When there has been evidence of tampering with containers it has been suggested that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry, when the ship was underway to be picked up by their accomplices. In recent cases when this was suggested it had been found that compartments on the ship may not have been searched or secure before the ship left port.

Other Attacks

8. Attacks by pirates or armed robbers have taken place outside the areas outlined above but at a significantly lower frequency. Though the vast majority of attacks are to secure cash and steal crew possessions or portable equipment there are still cases of ships and their cargoes being seized and the entire cargo, and occasionally the ship, being disposed of by the attackers.

FACTORS ENCOURAGING OR FAVOURING ATTACKERS

9. There are two factors which encourage or favour attackers and on which action should be taken.

Cash in the Ship's Safe

10. The belief that large sums of cash are carried in the master's safe attracts attackers. On several occasions this belief has been justified and substantial sums have been stolen. While carrying cash may sometimes be necessary to meet operational needs and crew requirements and to overcome exchange control restrictions in some States, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate the master or other crew members to open the safe. Even if the cash is dispersed throughout the ship the attackers will intimidate crew members until the locations have been revealed. Ship owners should consider ways of eliminating the need to carry large sums of cash on board ship. When this need arises because of exchange control restrictions imposed by States the matter should be referred to the ship's maritime administration to consider if representations should be made to encourage a more flexible approach as part of the international response to eliminate attacks by pirates and armed robbers.

Smaller Crews

11. The smaller crew numbers now found on board ships also favour the attacker. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or confined waters will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance for prolonged periods. Ship owners should ensure that security watches are enhanced if their vessel is in waters, or at anchor off ports, where attacks occur. Ship owners should also consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and protect their ships. The provision of piracy alarm systems on bridge wings and other vulnerable/lookout positions should be considered. And ship owners should seek to verify the bona fides of any security personnel they may engage locally.

RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

12. The recommended practices outlined below are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial interests and organisations and measures developed to enhance ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or masters of vessels operating in areas where attacks may occur.

The Anti-Attack Plan

13. All ships operating in waters where attacks occur should have an anti-attack plan. The anti-attack plan should be prepared having regard to the risks that may be faced, the crew numbers available, their capability and training, the ability to establish secure areas on board the ship and the surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided. The plan should, inter alia, cover:

A. The need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting and surveillance or detection equipment;

B. Crew responses if a potential attack is detected or an attack is underway;

C.The radio and alarm procedures to be followed, and the reports that should be made after an attack, or an attempted attack.

14. Anti-attack plans should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular it should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent. Aggressive responses once an attack is underway, and in particular once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board.

Routeing and Delaying Anchoring

15. If at all possible ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to take place and in particular seek to avoid bottle necks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than on vessels underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or longer routeing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during which the ship will be at risk. Charter party agreements should recognise that ships may need to delay arrival at ports where attacks occur, either when no berth is available for the ship, or off shore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.

Prior to Entering Areas where Attacks Occur.

16. Prior to the ship entering an area where attacks have occurred the ship's crew should have practised and perfected the procedures set down in the ship's anti-attack plan. Alarm signals and procedures should have been thoroughly practised. If instructions are to be given over the ship's address systems or personal radios they must be clearly understood by those who may not have fully mastered the language in which the instructions will be given.

17. It cannot be emphasised enough that all possible access points to the ship and any secure and key areas on it must be secured or controlled in port, at anchor and when the vessel is underway (but see also paragraphs 19 and 38). Crews should be trained in the use of any additional surveillance or detection equipment installed on the vessel. Planning and training must be on the basis that an attack will take place and not in the belief that with some luck it will not happen. Indications to attackers that the ship has an alert and trained crew implementing an anti-attack plan should help deter them from attacking the ship.

At Anchor or in Port

18. In areas where attacks occur it is important to limit, record and control those who are allowed access to a ship when it is in port or at anchor. Photographing those who board the ship can be a useful deterrent or assist the identification of attackers who may have had access to the ship prior to their attack. Film need only be developed in the event of a subsequent attack. Given that attackers may use knowledge of cargo manifests to select their targets every effort should be made to limit the circulation of documents which give information on the cargoes on board or their location on the ship.

19. Prior to leaving port the ship should be thoroughly searched and all doors or access points secured or controlled. This is particularly important in the case of the bridge, engine room, steering space and other vulnerable areas. Doors and access points should be regularly checked thereafter. The means of controlling doors or access points which would need to be used in the event of an on board emergency will need careful consideration. Ship or crew safety should not be compromised.

Watchkeeping and Vigilance

20. Maintaining vigilance is essential. All too often the first indication of an attack has been when the attackers appear on the bridge or in the master's cabin. Advance warning of a possible attack will give the opportunity to sound alarms, alert other ships and the coastal authorities, illuminate the suspect craft or undertake evasive manoeuvring or initiate other response procedures. Signs that the ship is aware it is being approached can deter attackers

21. When ships are in, or approaching, areas where attacks take place bridge watches and look outs should be doubled. Additional watches on the stern or covering radar "blind spots" should be considered. Companies should consider investing in low light binoculars for bridge staff and look outs. Radars should be constantly manned but it may be difficult to detect low profile fast moving craft on ship's radars. A yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting small craft approaching from astern when the vessel is underway. Use of an appropriately positioned yacht radar when the vessel is at anchor may also provide warning of the close approach of small craft.

22. It is particularly important to maintain a radar and visual watch for craft which may be trailing the vessel when underway but which could close with the vessel quickly when mounting an attack. Small craft which appear to be matching the speed of the vessel on a parallel or following course should always be treated with suspicion. When a suspect craft has been noticed it is important that an effective all round watch is maintained for fear the first craft is a decoy with the intention to board the ship from a second craft while attention is focused on the first.

23. Companies owning ships that frequently visit areas where attacks occur should consider the purchase and use of more sophisticated visual and electronic devices in order to augment both radar and visual watch capability against attackers' craft at night, thereby improving the prospects of obtaining an early warning of a possible attack. Additional advice on more sophisticated equipment appropriate for use on British ships will be provided on request through the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Great Minster House, 76 Marsham Street, London SW1P 4DR (see paragraph 65).

Radio Procedures

24. A suitably qualified Radio Operator should be on duty at all times when ships are in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. This duty should not be performed by the master though, on occasions, this may be unavoidable.

25. Prior to entering areas where attacks have occurred Radio Operators should practice and perfect all appropriate radio operational procedures and ensure all transmitters, including satellite ship earth stations, are fully operational and available for immediate use on distress and safety frequencies. Where a GMDSS installation is provided and "ship's position" data is not automatically updated from an associated electronic navigation aid, Radio Operators are strongly recommended to enter ship's position at regular intervals into the appropriate communications equipment manually. Where an INMARSAT ship earth station is provided it may prove useful to draft and store "standard messages" (see paragraph 33) for ready use in an emergency in either the equipment's memory or on computer disk. A special code for 'piracy/armed robbery attack' is now available for use on Digital Selective Calling (DSC) equipment. Where practicable and appropriate, DSC equipment should be modified to incorporate this facility. Masters should ensure that all procedures to generate a distress alert on any communications equipment are clearly marked on, or near, the equipment and all appropriate crew members briefed on their operation.

26. Masters should bear in mind the possibility that attackers are monitoring ship to shore communications and using intercepted information to select their targets. Caution should, therefore, be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks occur.

Radio Watchkeeping and Responses.

27. A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or naval authorities when in areas where attacks have occurred. Continuous watch should also be maintained on all distress and safety frequencies, particularly VHF Channel 16 and 2182 kHz. Ships should also ensure all maritime safety information broadcasts for the area are monitored. As it is anticipated that INMARSAT's enhanced group calling system (EGC) will normally be used for such broadcasts using the SafetyNET(SM) service, owners should ensure a suitably configured EGC receiver is continuously available when in, or approaching, areas where there is a risk of attack. Owners should also consider fitting a dedicated receiver for this purpose, i.e. one that is not incorporated into a ship earth station used for commercial purposes, to ensure no urgent broadcasts are missed.

28. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) recommends in MSC Circular 597, issued August 1992, that reports concerning attacks by pirates or armed robbers should be made to the relevant Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) for the area. Information on RCCs may be found in the Search and Rescue Section of volume 5 of the Admiralty List of Radio Signals. MSC Circular 597 also recommends that governments should arrange for the RCCs to be able to pass reports of attacks to the appropriate law enforcement agencies or naval authorities.

29. If suspicious movements are identified which may result in an imminent attack, the ship is advised to contact the relevant RCC. Where the master believes these movements could constitute a direct danger to navigation consideration should be given to broadcasting an "All Stations (CQ)" "danger message" as a warning to other ships in the vicinity as well as advising the appropriate RCC. A danger message should be transmitted in plain language on a VHF working frequency following an announcement on VHF Channel 16, and/or transmission of a DSC call on VHF Channel 70 using the "safety" priority. All such messages shall be preceded by the safety signal (Securite).

30. When, in his opinion, there is conclusive evidence that the safety of his ship is threatened, the master should immediately contact the relevant RCC and, if considered appropriate, authorise broadcast of an "All Stations" "Urgency Message" on VHF Channel 16, 2182 kHz, or any other radio communications service he considers appropriate; e.g. 500 kHz, INMARSAT, etc. All such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency signal (PAN PAN) and/or a DSC call on VHF Channel 70 and/or 2187.5 kHz using the "all ships urgency" category. If the Urgency signal has been used and an attack does not, in fact, develop the ship should cancel the message as soon as it knows that action is no longer necessary. This message of cancellation should likewise be addressed to "all stations".

31.Should an attack occur and, in the opinion of the master, the ship or crew are in grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance, he should immediately authorise the broadcast of a Distress message, preceded by the appropriate distress alerts (MAYDAY, SOS, DSC, etc), using the radio communication systems most appropriate for the area taking into account its GMDSS designation; i.e. A1, A2, A3 or A4. The appropriate RCC should acknowledge receipt and attempt to establish communications. To minimise delay, if using a ship earth station, ships should ensure the coast earth station associated with the RCC is used.

32. Masters should bear in mind that the distress signal is provided for use only in case of imminent danger and its use for less urgent purposes might result in insufficient attention being paid to calls from ships really in need of immediate assistance. Care and discretion must be employed in its use, to prevent its devaluation in the future. Where the transmission of the Distress signal is not fully justified use should be made of the Urgency signal. The Urgency signal has priority over all communications other than distress. Standard Message Formats

33. The standard formats for: Initial messages - piracy attack alert, and piracy attack/sighting/suspicious act reports which were agreed by the IMO Sub-Committee on Radio communi-cations in January 1993, are set out in Appendix 1.

Secreted VHF Transceiver

34. As communications equipment has been damaged by attackers to prevent an early alarm being raised, particularly when attacks have taken place off port, owners and masters are recommended to secrete a VHF transceiver on the ship to allow contact to be established with the shore authorities if the main communications equipment is put out of action.

Lighting

35. Ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard in particular to the provisions of Rule 20(b) of the 1972 Collision Regulations. Bow, and overside lights should be left on if possible. Ships must not keep on deck lights when underway as it may lead other ships to assume the ship is at anchor. Wide beam floods could illuminate the area astern of the ship. Signal projector lights can be used systematically to probe for suspect craft using radar guidance if possible. So far as is practicable crew members on duty outside the ship's secure areas when in port or at anchor should avail themselves of shadow and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights as this may make them targets for seizure by approaching attackers.

36. It has been suggested that ships should travel blacked out except for mandatory navigation lights. This may prevent attackers establishing points of reference when approaching a ship. In addition turning on the ship's lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dazzle them, and encourage them to desist. It is difficult, however, to maintain full blackout on a merchant ship. The effectiveness of this approach will ultimately depend in part on the level of moonlight, but primarily on the vigilance of the ship's crew. While suddenly turning on the ship's lights may alarm or dazzle attackers it could also place the crew at a disadvantage at a crucial point through temporary loss of their night vision.

Secure Areas

37. In accordance with the ship's anti-attack plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers' cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled at all times and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Consideration should be given to the installation of special access control systems to the ship's secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated glass if possible. Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, radio office, engine room and master's cabin should be strengthened and have special access control systems and automatic alarms.

38. Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled.

39. Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage, and recording of, the main access points to the ships secure areas, the corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge.

40. To prevent seizure of individual crew members by attackers - seizure and threatening a crew member is one of the more common means of attackers gaining control over a ship - all crew members not engaged on essential outside duties should remain within a secure area during the hours of darkness. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside such areas at night should remain in constant communication with the bridge and should have practised using alternative routes to return to a secure area in the event of an attack. Crew members who fear they may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack should select places in advance in which they can take temporary refuge.

41. There should be designated muster areas within the ship's secure areas where the crew can muster during an attack and communicate their location and numbers to the bridge.

Alarms

42. Alarm signals, including the ship's whistle, should be sounded on the approach of attackers. Alarms and signs of response can discourage attackers. Alarm signals or announcements which provide an indication at the point at which the attackers may board, or have boarded, may help crew members in exposed locations select the most appropriate route to return to a secure area.

Use of Distress Flares

43. The only flares authorised for carriage on board ship are intended for use if the vessel is in distress and is in need of immediate assistance. As with the unwarranted use of the Distress signal on the radio (see paragraph 32 above) use of distress flares simply to alert shipping rather than to indicate that the vessel is in grave and imminent danger may reduce their effect in the situations in which they are intended to be used and responded to. Radio transmissions should be used to alert shipping of the risk of attacks rather than distress flares. Distress flares should only be used when the master considers that the attackers actions are putting his ship in imminent danger.

Evasive Manoeuvring and Use of Hoses

44. Provided that navigational safety allows, masters should consider "riding off" attackers craft by heavy wheel movements as they approach. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter would be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. Manoeuvres of this kind should not be used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by vessels constrained by their draught in the confined deep water routes found, for example in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

45. The use of water hoses should also be considered though they may be difficult to train if evasive manoeuvring is also taking place. Water pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of water but the flow may swamp his boat and damage engines and electrical systems. Special fittings for training hoses could be considered which would also provide protection for the hose operator. A number of spare fire hoses could be rigged and tied down to be pressurised at short notice if a potential attack is detected.

46. Employing evasive manoeuvres and hoses must rest on a determination to successfully deter attackers or to delay their boarding to allow all crew members to gain the sanctuary of secure areas. Continued heavy wheel movements with attackers on board may lessen their confidence that they will be able to return safely to their craft and may persuade them to disembark quickly. However, responses of this kind could lead to reprisals by the attackers if they seize crew members and should not be engaged in unless the master is confident he can use them to advantage and without risk to those on board. They should not be used if the attackers have already seized crew members.

Firearms

47. The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged and will not be authorised by Her Majesty's Government. Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. In some jurisdictions killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence.

If Attackers Board

48. Early detection of potential attacks must be the first line of defence, action to prevent the attackers actually boarding the second, but there will be incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a vessel. The majority of pirates and armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and time may not be on their side, particularly if the crew are aware they are aboard and are raising the alarm. However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ.

49. When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at: A.securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the vessel; B.seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the vessel, and securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the vessel.

50. The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the vessel, e.g. by having gained access to the bridge or engine room, or by seizing crew members who they can threaten, to force the master or crew to comply with their wishes. However, even if the crew are all safely within secure areas the master will always have to consider the risk to the ship the attackers could cause outside those areas, e.g. by using firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.

51. If the master is certain that all his crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the secure areas place the entire ship at imminent risk then he may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to in paragraph 44 (above) to encourage the attackers to return to their craft. The possibility of a sortie by a well organised crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no risk to the crew.

52. For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear knowledge of where the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie party can use water hoses they stand an increased chance of success. The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to do so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will in turn increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area the sortie party should always stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crew member should not be undertaken as it may result in the crew member being isolated and seized by the attackers and the advantage turning to the attackers. Crew members should operate together and remain in constant communication with the bridge and should be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened.

53. If the crew do apprehend an attacker he should be placed in secure confinement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him to the custody of law enforcement officers or naval authorities of a coastal State at the earliest possible opportunity. Any evidence relating to his activities should also be handed over to the authorities who take him into custody.

If Attackers Gain Control

54. If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship the master officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers with the intention of maintaining the crew's control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship. There will be many circumstances when compliance with the attackers' demands will be the only safe alternative and when resistance or obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

55. In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the vessel, crew members should, if it is safe and practicable, leave CCTV recorders running.

56. As there have been occasions when entire crews have been locked up consideration should be given to secreting equipment within areas in which the crew could be detained to facilitate their early escape.

57. If ordered not to make any form of transmission informing shore authorities of the attack, any such order should be complied with as the pirates/robbers may carry equipment capable of detecting all radio signals, including satellite communications.

Action After an Attack and Reporting Incidents.

58. An immediate post attack report should be made to the relevant RCC and through them to the law enforcement agencies or naval authorities of the coastal State. As well as information on the identity and location of the ship, any injuries to crew members or damage to the ship should be reported as should the direction in which the attackers departed together with brief details of their numbers and, if possible, a description of their craft. If the crew have apprehended an attacker that should also be reported in this signal.

59. If an attack has resulted in the death of or serious injury to any person on board the ship or serious damage to the ship itself, an immediate signal should also be sent to the ship's maritime administration. There are, in any event, statutory requirements covering the duty to report deaths, serious injuries or serious damage to a ship to the maritime administration. In any event a report of an attack is vital if follow up action is to be taken by the ship's maritime administration.

60. Any CCTV or other recordings of the incident should be secured. If practicable, areas that have been damaged or rifled should be secured and remain untouched by crew members pending possible forensic examination by the law enforcement agencies of a coastal State. Crew members who came in contact with the attackers should be asked to prepare an individual report on their experience noting in particular any distinguishing features which could help subsequent identification of the attackers. A full inventory, including a description of any personal possessions or equipment taken, with serial numbers when known, should also be prepared.

61. As soon as possible after the incident a fuller report should be transmitted to the authorities of the coastal State in whose waters the attack occurred, or if on the high seas to the authorities of the nearest coastal State. Due and serious consideration should be given to complying with any request made by the competent authorities of the coastal State to allow law enforcement officers to board the vessel, take statements from crew members and undertake forensic and other investigations. Copies of any CCTV recordings, photographs, etc should be provided if they are available.

62. Any report transmitted to a coastal state as recommended under paragraph 58 should also be transmitted to the ship's maritime administration at the earliest opportunity. A complete report of the incident, including details of any follow up action that was taken or difficulties that may have been experienced, should eventually be submitted to the ship's maritime administration.

63. The reports received by maritime administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by Her Majesty's Government to the government of the coastal State on the incident and will also provide the basis for the United Kingdom's report (through the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions in London) to the IMO, required under the relevant IMO Assembly Resolutions on piracy and armed robbery at sea. The format required for reports to the IMO is attached at Appendix 2. Indeed, at present the lack of adequate and accurate reporting of attacks is directly affecting the ability to secure governmental and international action. Reports may also contribute to future refining and updating of the advice in this Marine Guidance Note.

64. Reports to the RCC, coastal State and the ship's maritime administration should also be made if an attack has been unsuccessful.

65. It is hoped that using RCCs as recommended by the IMO in MSC Circular 597 will eliminate communication difficulties. However, if a British ship experiences difficulties in establishing, or has been unable to establish, contact with the authorities of the relevant coastal State a signal, Email or fax should be sent to the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, London (Telex 22221 DETR TRANSEC; Email: transec.detr@gtnet.gov.uk; fax: 0171 676 2174) outlining the difficulties experienced.

SUMMARY OF GENERAL PRECAUTIONS

66. For ease of reference a summary of the general precautions that may be taken are given in Appendix 3.

JURISDICTION AND INTERVENTION

Criminal Jurisdiction

67. Piracy is an offence committed on the high seas, or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. A pirate who has been apprehended on the high seas therefore falls to be dealt with under the laws of the flag State of his captors.

68. Within territorial waters, jurisdiction over armed robbers or pirates rests solely with the coastal State.

Naval Intervention

69. International law requires any warship or other government vessel to repress piracy on the high seas. Such vessels would be expected to take action if they encountered pirates, or come to the aid of any vessel under attack by pirates, on the high seas. A naval vessel of any State can pursue pirates on the high seas but not into the territorial waters of another State without that State's prior consent.

70. Foreign naval vessels on innocent passage within the territorial waters of another State cannot exercise any enforcement powers or pursue attackers without prior authorisation from the coastal State. However, they may render humanitarian assistance to a vessel in danger or distress.

71. Ships from the Royal Navy will take all appropriate measures to respond to incidents of piracy on the high seas, and to provide humanitarian assistance to vessels attacked in territorial waters, whenever they are on hand to do so. However, the likelihood of a Royal Navy vessel being nearby when an incident occurs, particularly in distant waters, will not be great. British ships will therefore need to rely on their own vigilance and resources to prevent attacks and on the capability of coastal States to suppress piracy or armed robbery.

Role of the Coastal State

72. Her Majesty's Government looks to the coastal State to ensure the safety and freedom from attack of ships exercising rights of innocent passage in the territorial sea of a coastal State and in their ports. The Government also looks to the coastal State to pursue, prosecute and punish pirates or armed robbers who may operate, reside or have their base of operations in their territory. The activities of pirates and armed robbers now pose a real threat not only to those on board ship but also to the territory and interests of coastal States through the threat of a major pollution incident following an attack. The Government urges ship owners, masters and crews to co-operate to the greatest possible extent with the authorities of coastal States in their efforts to pursue and prosecute attackers.

AMENDMENTS

79. If significant changes in the locations and patterns of attacks occur further brief Marine Guidance Notes will be issued advising of new areas where attacks may occur. The text of this Marine Guidance Note may be amended to reflect experience based on the reports submitted to maritime administrations and also on reports submitted to the IMO by other flag States or by coastal States.

Transport Security Division (TRANSEC) Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Great Minster House, 76 Marsham Street, London SW1P 4DR Telephone: 0171 676 2845; Telex: 22221 DETR TRANSEC; Email: transec.detr@gtnet.gov.uk May 1998

APPENDIX 1
INITIAL MESSAGE-PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK ALERT

1. Vessel's name and call sign/INMARSAT ID (plus ocean region code). MAYDAY (see Note).

PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK.

2. Vessel's position (and time of position UTC). 3. Nature of Event.

Note: It is expected that this message will be a Distress Message because the vessel or persons will be in grave or imminent danger when under attack. Where this is not the case, the word MAYDAY is to be omitted. Use of distress priority (3) in the INMARSAT system will not require MAYDAY to be included.

PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK/SIGHTING/SUSPICIOUS ACT REPORT

1. Vessel's name and call sign.

2. Reference initial PIRACY ALERT.

3. Position of incident.

4. Date/time of incident (UTC).

5. Details of incident, eg A.Method of attack. B.Description of suspect craft. C.Number and brief description of pirates. E.Injuries to crew. F.Damage to ship. G.Brief details of stolen property/cargo.

6.Last observed movements of pirate/suspect vessel, eg Date/time/course/position/speed.

7.Assistance required.

8.Preferred communications with reporting vessel, eg Appropriate Coast Radio Station. HF/MF/VHF. INMARSAT ID (plus ocean region code).

9. Date/time of report (UTC)

APPENDIX 2
ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED AGAINST SHIPS REPORTED BY MEMBER STATES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN CONSULTATIVE STATUS

*The position given should be as accurate as possible including latitude and longitude co-ordinates or as bearing and distance from a conspicuous landmark.

APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF GENERAL PRECAUTIONS.

Be vigilant - the majority of attacks will be deterred if the robbers are aware that they have been observed, and that the crew has been alerted and is prepared to resist attempts to board. Ensure that crew members are seen to be constantly moving around the ship, making random rather than predictable patrols.

Maintain a 24 visual and security watch - including short range radar surveillance of the waters around the ship. The use of a small yacht radar, fitted in such a way to ensure complete coverage of the stern, unobscured by the radar shadow of the ship itself, should be considered. Keep a special look-out for small boats and fishing boats that pirates often use because they are difficult to observe on radar.

In piracy "hotspots", discourage the crew form trading with locals using small craft which may approach the ship. Strengthen night watches - especially around the rear of the vessel and particularly between the hours of 0100 and 0600 when most attacks occur, with continuous patrols linked by "walkie talkie" to the bridge. A drill should be established for regular two-way communication between the watch and the bridge. If possible, an additional officer should assist the normal bridge watchkeepers at night, in order to provide a dedicated radar and visual watch for small craft which might attempt to manoeuvre alongside, and allow the watchkeepers to concentrate on normal navigational duties.

Seal off means of access to the ship - fit the hawse pipe plates, lock doors and hatches etc. While taking due account of the need for escape in the event of fire or other emergency, so far as possible all means of access to the accommodation should be sealed off and windows and doors of crew members quarters should be kept locked at all times. Blocking access between the aft deck and the crew members quarters is particularly important.

Establish radio contact - and agree emergency signals specifically for pirate attacks with crew, shore authorities etc. Provide adequate lighting - deck and over-side lights, particularly at the bow and stern, should be provided to illuminate the deck and the waters beyond and to dazzle potential borders. Searchlights should be available on the bridge wings, and torches should be carried by the security patrols to identify suspicious craft. Such additional lighting should not however be so bright as to obscure navigation lights or interfere with the safe navigation of other vessels.

Water hose and other equipment - which may be used to repel potential borders should be readily available. Keep a constant supply of water provided to the hoses. In danger areas keep the deck wash pump in operation at all times - spray water over the rear deck where it is easiest for the attackers to board.

Reduce opportunities for theft - remove all portable equipment from the deck, so far as is possible stow containers containing valuables door-to-door and in tiers, seal off access to the accommodation. Establish a secure area or areas - if large numbers of armed robbers succeed in boarding the ship, it may be essential for crew members to retreat to a secure area or areas. Depending upon the construction of the accommodation and the extent to which areas can be effectively sealed off, the secure area may be established in the accommodation as a whole, or in more restricted parts around the bridge and inside the engine room. Provision should be made, however, for escape during a fire or other emergency.

Inform crew members of the anti-attack plan - hold training exercises and ensure that they are fully briefed on the actions to take in the event of an attack.